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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to its
order granting the Plaintiffs Petition for Permission to Appeal Interlocutory Order
dated March 23, 2009.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Did the district court err when it limited the scope of the Plaintiffs treating
medical providers' proposed testimony, because Plaintiff had not complied with
Rule 26(a)(3)(B), even though his providers were designated as expert witnesses
pursuant to Rule 26(a)(3)(A) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure?
Standard of Review: Whether or not the trial court erred in limiting the
Plaintiffs treating medical providers' proposed testimony, when they had been
identified as expert witnesses pursuant to Rule 26(a)(3)(A) U.R.C.P, is a question
of law which the appellate courts review for correctness. See Peterson v. Board of
Education, 855 P.2d 241, 242, (Utah 1993).
STATUTES AND RULES, THE INTERPRETATION OF WHICH IS OF
CENTRAL IMPORTANCE TO THE APPEAL
Rule 26(a)(3)(A), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure:
A party shall disclose to other parties the identity of any person who may be used
at trial to present evidence under Rules 702, 703, or 705 of the Utah Rules of
Evidence.
Rule 26 (a)(3)(B), Utah Rule of Civil Procedure:
(a)(3)(B) Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court, this
disclosure shall, with respect to a witness who is retained or specially employed to
-1-

provide expert testimony in the case or whose duties as an employee of the party
regularly involved giving expert testimony, be accompanied by a written report
prepared and signed by the witness or party. The report shall contain the subject
matter on which the expert is expected to testify; the substance of the facts and
opinions to which the expert is expected to testify; a summary of the grounds for
each opinion; the qualifications of the witness, including a list of all publications
authored by the witness within the preceding ten years; the compensation to be
paid for the study and testimony; and a listing of any other cases in which the
witness has testified as an expert at trial or by deposition within the preceding four
years.
Rule 702, Utah Rules of Evidence (Testimony by Experts):
(a) Subject to the limitations in subsection (b), if scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or
otherwise.
(b) Scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge may serve as the basis for
expert testimony if the scientific, technical, or other principles or methods
underlying the testimony meet a threshold showing that they (I) are reliable, (ii)
are based upon sufficient facts or data, and (iii) have been reliably applied to the
facts of the case.
(c)The threshold showing required by subparagraph (b) is satisfied if the
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principles or methods on which such knowledge is based, including the
sufficiency of facts or data and the manner of their application to the facts of the
case, are generally accepted by the relevant expert community.
Rule 703. Utah Rules of Evidence (Bases of Opinion Testimony by Experts):
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or
inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the
hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in
forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be
admissible in evidence.
Rule 705, Utah Rules of Evidence (Disclosure of Facts or Data Underlying
Expert Opinion):
The expert may testify in terms of opinion or inference and give reasons therefor
without prior disclosure of the underlying facts or data, unless the court requires
otherwise. The expert may in any event be required to disclose the underlying
facts or data on cross-examination.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts previously submitted do not require supplementation in the
Plaintiffs Reply Brief.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Pursuant to the Utah Court of Appeals decision in Pete v. Youngblood, 2006
UT App. 303, 141 P.3d 629 and Rule 26(a)(3)(A) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, a treating medical provider, who may provide testimony subject to
Rule 702, 703, or 705 of the Utah Rules or Evidence, must be identified as an
-3-

expert witness. However, treating medical providers who are designated as expert
witnesses, pursuant to Rule 26(a)(3)(A), are not required to comply with the
requirements of Rule 26(a)(3)(B) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure as they are
not specially retained or employed to provide expert testimony. Consequently,
any limitation of a treating medical provider's proposed testimony is only valid if
he or she was not identified as an expert under Rule 26(a)(3)(A). As the Plaintiff
("Drew") in this action had complied with Rule 26(a)(3)(A) U.R.C.P., the trial
court's limitation of his treating medical provider's testimony for the failure to
comply with Rule 26(a)(3)(B) was error and prejudicially limits the ability of
Drew to seek redress for the negligence of the Defendant.
ARGUMENT
1.

The Plaintiffs Timely Designation Under Rule 26(a)(3)(A) of His
Treating Medical Providers as Expert Witnesses Precludes the
Limitation of Their Proposed Testimony.
Rule 26(a)(3)(A) U.R.C.P. and the Utah Court of Appeal's decision in Pete

v. Youngblood, 2006 UT App. 303, 141 P.3d 629, were misinterpreted by the trial
court to mean that any witness who may provide expert testimony is subject to
Rule 26(a)(3)(B) U.R.C.P. This position is erroneous. Rule 26(a)(3)(A) and
Youngblood simply require the disclosure of what could be termed a "hybrid
witness," i.e., one who will provide both fact and expert testimony but who was
not specially retained or employed to provide expert testimony. This approach is
not unique.
In discussing the dual or hybrid nature of treating medical providers, the
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United States District Court for the District of Kansas noted that even though
treating medical providers act as both fact and expert witnesses, their dual role
does not compel them to comply with the same requirements of a specially
retained expert:
Fed. Rule Civ. P. 26(a)(2) clearly contemplates the general category
of persons who give expert testimony-namely testimony regarding
evidence under u Rules 702, 703, or 705 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence"-and a subcategory of witnesses who are "retained or
specially employed to provide expert testimony in the case" for whom
an expert report is not required. Treating physicians fall into the first,
broader category of experts who are required to provide a written
report. See Wirtz v. Kansas Farm Bureau Services, Inc. 355 F. Supp.
2d 1190, 1211 (D. Kansas 2005).
Similarly, Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure also contemplates
that some witnesses only provide factual testimony, others provide mixed fact and
expert testimony (as is the case for treating medical providers), and still others are
experts specially retained or employed for the sole purposes of providing
testimony at trial. In Youngblood, the Utah Court of Appeals discussed Rule 26 as
it applies to the first two categories of witnesses as follows:
If, however, the treating physician also offers an opinion as to the
standard of care or whether that standard has been breached, the
testimony is no longer simply factual. "In order to determine if an
expert need be identified before trial, [r]ule 26 focuses not on the
status of the witness but rather on the substance of the
testimony....("[Treating physicians'] status depends on the content of
their testimony: If they only testify as to what they observed and did
within the physician-patient relationship, then they would be fact
witnesses; if in addition to testifying to the facts, the treating
physician offered an opinion, then they would be expert witnesses.")
(internal citations omitted). Youngblood at ^f 14. See also Musser v.
Gentiva Health Services, 356 F.3d 751, 756 (7th Cir. 2004).
In short, the Youngblood court recognized that a treating physician will
-5-

likely provide factual testimony based on her examination and treatment and
opinion testimony based upon her education and experience. This dual or hybrid
nature of a treating physician therefore led the court to conclude that they must be
disclosed pursuant to Rule 26(a)(3)(A). However, the disclosure requirement did
not subject the hybrid witness to Rule 26(a)(3)(B). See Youngblood at %\ 5 and the
Utah Court of Appeal's Conclusion.
PARAGRAPH 15
...We therefore hold that Pete was required under Rule 26(a)(3)(A) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure to identify Doxey as a person who may be used at trial to
provide expert testimony.
CONCLUSION
...The trial court was correct in holding that a treating physician who intends to
offer an opinion on the standard of care and whether that standard was breached
must be designated as an expert under Rule 26(a)(3)(A) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. And, because Pete did not designate Doxey as an expert, the trial court
could properly exclude his affidavit.
This application of Rule 26 is also consistent with United States Court of
Appeals 10th Circuit's interpretation of the federal rule in Watson v. United States,
485 F.3d 1100, 1107 (10th Cir. 2007), where the court stated:
Ms. Watson contends that the district court also erred by failing to
require Dr. Goforth1 to prepare and present an expert report before
taking the stand. The rule of law in question, Rule 26(a)(2)(B) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, provides in pertinent part: "Except
as otherwise stipulated or directed by the court, this disclosure shall,
with respect to a witness who is specially retained or specially
employed to provide expert testimony in case or whose duties as an
employee of the party regularly involved giving expert testimony, be

!

Dr. Goforth is a medical doctor and at the time the Watson case was heard
he was the clinical director at the United States Department of Justice's Bureau of
Prisons Federal Transfer Center in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. Significantly, the
10th Circuit expressly held that Dr. Goforth was an expert in health care in federal
prisons. See Watson at page 1106.
-6-

accompanied by a written report prepared and signed by the witness."
While the Rule focuses on those who must file an expert report, by
exclusion it contemplates that some persons are not required to file
reports and that these include individuals who are employed by a
party and do not regularly give expert testimony. It is undisputed Dr.
Goforth meets exactly this description; accordingly we, like the
district court, can discern no violation of the applicable Rule (internal
citations omitted).
See also, Brief of Appellant at pages 15-19 and Martin v. CSX Transp, Inc.,
215 F.R.D. 554, 557 (S.D. Ind. 2003) where the court stated as follows:
Turning to the language of the rule, the Court finds that Rule
26(a)(2)(B) expressly limits its reach to those experts retained or
specially employed. ("there are two sets of experts whose opinions
may be presented at trial - those who are retained and those who are
not retained."). In the case at bar, it is undisputed that Martin's
treating physicians are not specially employed to provide testimony.
[PL's Br., p. 4]. The anticipated opinion testimony of these
physicians was formulated during the examination and care of Martin,
not in anticipation of litigation. These uncontradicted facts weigh
against the necessity of requiring an expert report. Further support
for this conclusion is found in the Advisory Committee Notes
regarding the 1993 amendments to Rule 26, which state that "[a]
treating physician . . . can be deposed or called to testify at trial
without any requirement for a written report (internal citations
omitted).
Drew submits that because he did identify his treating medical providers as
expert witnesses (Record at 188-190), the district court erred when it held his
treating medical providers were subject to both Rule 26(a)(3)(A) and Rule
26(a)(3)(B) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
2.

Rule 26(a)(3)(A) Provides Notice to the Adverse Party of the
Anticipated Testimony of a Treating Physician. This Disclosure along
with the Rules of Discovery Allow Fact Gathering and Prevents
Prejudice.
Absent a Rule 26(a)(3)(B) report, Defendant argues he is prejudiced and is
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not able to adequately prepare his case for trial. Drew addresses the Defendant's
arguments in turn.
A.

Treatment and Examination Records Do Provide the Basis and
Foundation for the Fact and Opinion Testimony of a Treating
Medical Provider.

In his initial brief, Drew addressed the sufficiency of a treating medical
provider's reports vis-a-vis a retained or a specially employed expert as a
substantive basis for why treating providers are not required to comply with Rule
26(a)(3)(B). See Brief of Appellant at pages 9-10. To summarize, Drew's treating
medical providers' medical records/reports clearly detail the history of his claimed
injuries, their findings, test results, observations, and ultimately their conclusions
and prognosis that his injuries were caused by the subject motor vehicle collision
which is the subject of this appeal. See Exhibits 1-3 contained in the Brief of
Appellant. Of note is that Drew's experts' medical reports mirror the Defendant's
own Rule 35 expert's report's conclusions [only from a treating provider's
perspective and not of a specially retained expert]. As such, Drew submits the
Defendant is not prejudiced by the lack of a formal report. Moreover, Drew
submits the Defendant has access to the same quality of information Drew
received from the Defendant's expert's Rule 35 report as the Defendant's expert
simply comments on Drew's treating providers' records and treatment and
summarizes the same with his own conclusions (Record at 298-311).
B.

Drew's Treating Provider's Records Establish Their
Qualifications to Testify as a Fact and Opinion Witness.

Defendant next argues that unless Drew' hybrid experts are required to
-8-

comply with Rule 26(a)(3)(B), he is unable to determine the qualifications of
Drew's providers and thus formulate an adequate trial strategy. However, Drew's
experts' qualification are already contained within their medical records
previously provided to the Defendant and substantiate the foundation for their fact
and opinion testimony2. Drew submits his treating medical providers' records
identify their training, speciality and background in a manner substantively similar
to the Defendant's Rule 35 expert3 (Record at 260 and 298-311). Consequently,
there is no prejudice to the Defendant for not receiving a formal curriculum vitae
as he is already on notice as to the background of Drew's treating experts'
qualifications.
C.

The Disclosure Requirements of Rule 26(a)(3)(A) Witnesses is Not
Substantively Different than Rule 26(a)(3)(B) Experts,

Defendant also argues that unless a treating provider is required to provide a
Rule 26(a)(3)(B) report, he would incur unrealistic challenges in preparing his

2

Two examples would be Travis J. DowDell, D.C. who is clearly identified
as a chiropractic physician and Scott Adelman, M.D., FAAPM&R, FBEM who is
identified as an expert in physical medicine and rehabilitation with a specialty in
electro diagnostic medicine. See Exhibits 1-2 of Drew's Brief of Appellant.
defendant's argument is inconsistent with his own Rule 26(a)(3)(B)
disclosures as his specially retained medical expert has not provided any
substantive information addressing his background or qualifications above-andbeyond that of Drew's treating providers. While the Defendant's Rule 35 expert's
curriculum vitae for his specially retained expert (Dr. Knorpp) contains
quantitatively more information such as where Dr. Knorpp went to school, medical
licenses held, and work history, there is no qualitative difference under his
education and certification sections from what is contained in Mr. Drew's medical
providers' records - the information actually necessary to determine the
foundational basis for the proposed testimony. See Record at page 260 and pages
298-311 and Exhibits 1-2 of Drew's Brief of Appellant.
-9-

defense for trial. This position ignores the very nature of Rule 26 and the
discovery process in general. Specifically, the extent of discovery is always
within the discretion of a party litigant and her counsel. Making decisions as to
whether one should depose a witness to determine the knowledge, background,
and familiarity of the witness' proposed testimony is equally applicable to fact
(Rule 26(a)(3)(A)) and expert (Rule 26(a)(3)(B)) witnesses. As Drew was
required to and did identify his hybrid witnesses, the Defendant was placed on
notice as to what witnesses and issues may be utilized at trial. In addition, with
the Rule 26(a)(3)(A) disclosure, the Defendant had full access to all relevant
discovery options available under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure including
interrogatories, requests for admission, and requests for production of documents.
Finally, pursuant to Rule 26(a)(1) U.R.C.P., Drew also had basic disclosure
requirements that provided additional information to the Defendant such as
damages claimed, a listing of all witnesses (fact and expert) with discoverable
information, discoverable documents, etc. Drew submits this collective
information gathering process assists the Defendant in formulating his trial
strategy without any undue prejudice or delay. Drew's position is supported in the
Youngblood decision where the court stated:
The failure to disclose experts prejudiced [defendant] because there
are countermeasures that could have been taken that are not
applicable to fact witnesses, such as attempting to disqualify the
expert testimony..., retaining rebuttal experts, and holding additional
depositions to retrieve the information not available because of the
absence of a report. In sum, we agree with the district court that even
treating physicians and treating nurses must be designated as experts
if they are to provide expert testimony.... We agree that the manner in
-10-

which discovery is conducted concerning a fact witness and an expert
is quite different. If Pete intended to call Doxey to offer an opinion
as to the standard of care or whether the standard had been breached,
Youngblood was entitled to notice as required by Utah Rule of Civil
Procedure 26(a)(3)(A), Youngblood at ^f 17(internal citations omitted)
In a similar vein, in Watson v. United States, 485 F.3d 1100, 1108 (10th Cir.
2007), the 10th Circuit stated:
Neither are we able to disregard that the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure approved by Congress do supply other mechanisms besides
formal reports, for extracting the views of an expert witness like Dr.
Goforth; sandbagging is not necessarily inevitable. Generally all
witnesses, regardless of their status, must be identified, with contact
information, in a party's Rule 26(a)(1)(A) disclosures. Moreover,
parties must also disclose inter alia, a copy or location of a all
documents, electronically stored information, and tangible things that
are in possession, custody, or control of the party that the disclosing
party may use to support its claims or defenses, unless solely for
impeachment {emphasis in original).
In short, the rules provide the Defendant with the mechanism to review
proposed expert testimony and make informed discovery choices based upon such
a designation. As Drew provided the Defendant his Rule 26(a)(3)(A) disclosures
and complied with his discovery obligations, there was no prejudice to the
Defendant.
D.

Requiring Treating Medical Providers to Have Biomechanical
Training to Render Causation and Prognosis Opinions Ignores
Medical Training and Impermissibly Narrows the Role of
Treating Physicians.

The Defendant next argues that unless a medical provider is a trained
biomechanical expert he or she can only testify that as one possibility, the subject
injury was caused by the sequence of events listed in a plaintiffs complaint i.e., an
automobile collision. See Appellee's Brief at page 14.
-11-

The Defendant's argument is flawed for a variety of reasons. Physicians
make cause-and-effect decisions whenever they treat a patient. To this end, they
are taught to do so through rigorous schooling and ultimately in their residency
programs. Defendant's argument that a physician must be biomechanically trained
to opine on causation or prognosis, is an unrealistic expectation that ignores the
physician's medical background.
It is within the normal range of duties for a health care provider to
develop opinions regarding causation and prognosis during the
ordinary course of an examination. To assume otherwise is a limiting
perspective, which narrows the role of a treating physician. Instead,
to properly treat and diagnose a patient, the doctor needs to
understand the cause of a patient's injuries. See McCloughan, 208
F.R.D. at 242 ("doctors do not operate in a vacuum . . . . Thus, the
[c]ourt believes causation, diagnosis, and prognosis would be based
on the treating physician's personal knowledge . . . ."). As such, a
physician "whose proposed opinion testimony will come from his
knowledge acquired as a treating physician is not someone from
whom a Rule 26(a)(3)(B) report is required." Sircher v. City of
Chicago, 1999 WL 569568 (N.D.I11. 1999) (emphasis in original).
See e.g., Martin v. CSX Tramp., 215 F.R.D. 554, 557 (S.D. Ind.
2003).
The error in the Defendant's position is further compounded in that absent
Drew (or any other Plaintiff) treating with a physician who is also a qualified
biomechanical expert, in every medical sub-specialty of that provider he consulted
with, he would be precluded from presenting evidence from them regarding the
causation of his injuries. As Drew is unaware of any medical provider in the State
of Utah with such qualifications, he (as will all plaintiffs) would be effectively
precluded from presenting testimony to the jury as to the causation of his injuries.
In a similar vein, a non-medical provider, such as a biomechanical engineer,
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cannot testify that a particular incident was or was not the cause of Drew's
injuries.
We also reject Chadwickfs alternative claim of error concerning the
lack of expert testimony. Chadwick asserts that the trial court should
have permitted Chadwick's father, an electrical engineer with
expertise in fluid mechanics, to give expert testimony as to the
hydraulic principles of venous blood transportation. We think the trial
court properly excluded this testimony. It may be that many general
scientific principles apply to both fluid mechanics and the human
circulatory system. Nonetheless, we think it is sound policy to limit
expert testimony in medical malpractice cases to that which is within
the doctor's specific field of practice. See Burton v. Youngblood, 711
P.2d 245, 248 (Utah 1985) ("practitioner of one school of medicine is
not competent to testify as an expert in a malpractice action against a
practitioner of another school"). As an example, even though both
are medical doctors, an ocular plastic surgeon is not competent to
testify in a medical malpractice action against a general plastic
surgeon who performed eyelid surgery. Burton, 711 P.2d at 249.
To adopt Chadwick's position, although its creativity is
acknowledged, would allow geologists to give expert testimony as
to the appropriate principles to be employed in the extraction of
gallstones. We think such a result would not enhance justice in
medical malpractice cases. Chadwick v. Nielsen, 763 P.2d 817, 822
(Utah App. 1988), (emphasis added).
In short, biomechanical engineers, geologists, and/or electrical engineers do
not have the qualifications to determine if someone was injured in an accident
unless he or she is also a trained physician. In contrast, physicians are trained to
make these decisions. The reality of the Defendant's position, if adopted, would
be that Drew and indeed all plaintiffs in the State of Utah would never be able to
sustain a damage claim as a Plaintiff would not be able to use a physician to testify
as to damages or a biomechanical engineer to testify as to damages. 4 While such a

4

Drew notes that the Defendant's own Rule 35 examiner is not
biomechanically trained (Record at page 260) yet he provides opinions as to
-13-

position may be beneficial to the Defendant, it clearly is not a position articulated
by the Utah State Constitution or by statute and clearly is not within the public
policy of this state to deny injured parties access to the court's and ultimate redress
for injuries incurred through no fault of their own.
The final problem with the Defendant's position on biomechanical
testimony is that it imposes a legal standard on the medical community as to how
they practice medicine. In short, Defendant's argument fails to take into account a
physician's training and background. Specifically, medical school and
subsequent residency programs are designed to teach a physician how to analyze
and interpret a broad variety of objective and subjective claims of a patient based
upon historical reviews, examinations and test results in order to formulate an
accurate diagnosis and treatment plan. For example, in Harrison's Principles of
Internal Medicine, 12th Edition, Wilson et al editors. Chapter 1: The Practice of
Medicine and Chapter 2: Qualitative Aspects of Clinical Reasoning, it states:
The ability to extract from a mass of contradictory physical signs and
from the crowded computer printouts of laboratory data those items
that are of crucial significance, to know in a difficult case whether to
"treat" or to "watch," to determine when a clinical clue is worth
pursuing or when to dismiss a "red herring," and to estimate in any
given patient whether a proposed treatment entails a greater risk than
the disease are all involved in all decisions which the clinician,
skilled in the practice of medicine, must make many times each day.
This combination of medical knowledge, intuition and judgment is
termed the art of medicine. It is as necessary to the practice of
medicine as a sound scientific basis....Ideally, the narration of
symptoms or problems should be in the patient's own
words...Physical signs are the objective and verifiable marks of

causation and prognosis of Drew's injuries.
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disease and represent solid, indisputable facts....The process of
clinical reasoning...is based upon factors such as experience and
learning, inductive and deductive reasoning, interpretation of
evidence...experienced clinicians begin to form hypothesis based on
the chief complaint and on the responses to initial questioning, and
they ask further questions in a sequence that allows them to evaluate
the initial hypothesis and if necessary shorten or amend the list of
possibilities (emphasis in original). See also Cecil Textbook of
Medicine, 20th edition, Part V, Principles of Evaluation and
Management, Bennett & Plum editors.
In summary, Drew submits the basis and training of his medical providers
was and is to review his complaints, examine him, conduct tests, and then
objectively formulate a medical plan that will address his complaints with their
findings. The troubling nature of the Defendant's position, regarding whether a
treating medical provider is qualified to diagnosis the cause of an illness and
formulate a prognosis based upon treatment, absent a biomechanical background,
is that it ignores a physician's formal medical training and background and instead
injects a legal standard that contradicts the medical community's own standards.
In other words, the Defendant argues the legal community should control the
decision making process of the medical community.
CONCLUSION
Drew properly disclosed his treating medical providers as witnesses who
will testify as both factual and expert witnesses. Denying him the right call them
to testify as to prognosis and causation of his injuries, absent compliance with
Rule 26(a)(3)(B), violates the intent of the meaning of Rule 26(a)(3)(A) and the
decision in Pete v. Youngblood.

Significantly, the Defendant's position not only

limits the proposed testimony of treating medical providers but it places
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evidentiary burdens on him and all plaintiffs in this state which makes it
improbable that any injured party could obtain redress for injuries incurred as the
result of the negligence of a third party. To this end, Drew prays for an order
reversing the district court.
DATED this ^ P _ day of September, 2009.
GREGORY & SWAPP, PLLC
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Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant Alan Drew
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